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The first few months of 2008 saw crude oil prices breach one barrier after 
another. They topped $100 a barrel for the first time on Feb. 19, then rose past 
$103.76 about two weeks later, surpassing the previous inflation-adjusted peak, 
established in 1980. In April and early May, oil prices pushed past $110 and then 
$120 a barrel and beyond.1 
These milestones reflect a new era in oil markets. After the tumult of the 
early 1980s, prices remained relatively tame for two decades—in both real and 
nominal terms (Chart 1). This long stretch of stability ended in 2004, when 
oil topped $40 a barrel for the first time, then embarked on a steep climb that 
continued into this year.
Modern economies run on oil, so it’s important to understand how recent 
years—with  their  surging  prices—differ  from  the  preceding  two  decades. 
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A good starting point is strong 
demand, which has pushed world 
oil markets close to capacity. New 
supplies haven’t kept up with this 
demand, fueling expectations that oil 
markets will remain tight for the fore-
seeable future. A weakening dollar has 
put upward pressure on the price of a 
commodity that trades in the U.S. cur-
rency. And because a large share of 
oil production takes place in politically 
unstable regions, fears of supply dis-
ruptions loom over markets. 
These factors have fed the steady, 
sometimes swift rise of oil prices in 
recent years. Their persistence suggests 
the days of relatively cheap oil are 
over and the global economy faces a 
future of high energy prices. How they 
play out will shape oil markets—and 
determine prices—for years to come.
Supply and Demand
As incomes rise, economies use 
more energy for transport, heating and 
cooling and producing goods and ser-
vices. A broad cross section of nearly 
180 countries shows that doubling 
per capita income more than doubles 
per capita oil consumption (Chart 2). 
China and India, two giants with 
a combined population of nearly 2.4 
billion, shook themselves out of a 
long economic slumber and began 
growing rapidly in the 1990s. Adjusted 
for inflation and purchasing power 
parity, China’s per capita GDP rose 
from $1,103 in 1990 to $4,088 in 2005; 
India’s went from $1,202 to $2,222. In 
this decade, new energy demand from 
China, India and other emerging coun-
tries has added to continued growth 
from the U.S., Europe and other parts 
of the world.
As economic activity in the U.S., 
the world’s largest oil consumer, began 
accelerating in 2003, markets began 
feeling the full force of the world’s 
increased appetite for oil. Global con-
sumption rose from 82.6 million barrels 
a day in 2004 to 85.6 million in 2007. 
Since the beginning of the oil era,  
prices had ebbed and flowed around 
the U.S. economy’s ups and downs. 
Now, markets view demand increases 
as a fact of life that won’t be blunted 
much by a slowing U.S. economy.
With consumption on the rise, 
oil markets grew tighter as suppli-
ers neared productive capacity. The 
How much each country contributes 
to increases in global energy demand 
depends on its population and rate of 
income growth. Big nations moving 
quickly up the income ladder have 
huge implications for oil markets.
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Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), a 13-member group 
that produces more than a third of 
the world’s oil, has maintained excess 
capacity of only 1 million to 2 million 
barrels a day since 2004, down from 4 
million in 2001 and 5.6 million in 2002 
(Chart 3). 
Although OPEC’s excess capacity 
has rebounded from its 2005 low, the 
gains are largely in heavy crude oils 
that can only be processed in special-
ized refineries. Those facilities are run-
ning full bore, so the added supplies 
aren’t relieving a tight market. The 
latest evidence also suggests OPEC is 
now restraining its output.
While some warn that oil pro-
duction has peaked—or will soon—
most industry experts contend that oil 
resources are plentiful; it just takes 
time and money to get them out of 
the ground and into the market. 
Higher prices have done what 
economics would predict—stimulated 
efforts to increase supply. Companies 
have expanded their exploration 
budgets. Oil-producing nations have 
announced new projects. Drilling 
activity is at a high level, both off-
shore and on land. Wages and oilfield 
services costs are being bid up, while 
shortages persist for some key skills 
and equipment. 
So far, new supplies haven’t mate-
rialized quickly enough to keep up 
with growth in world demand, largely 
because various hurdles have slowed 
their development. Oil resources, for 
example, are concentrated in countries 
with state-run oil companies or little 
economic freedom. Where market sig-
nals aren’t allowed to work, incentives 
to boost production may be muted.2 
Oil demand is inelastic in the 
short run—that is, it doesn’t react 
quickly to changing prices. Consumers 
adjust their spending to maintain con-
sumption as prices rise, even if they 
have to pay more for it.3 Most likely, 
this reflects businesses’ commitment to 
keep up production and individuals’ 
need to drive to work, run errands and 
heat homes. 
When demand is inelastic, even 
modest tightening in markets translates 
into strong price movements. In recent 
years, this inelasticity has magnified 
tight markets’ impact on prices.
The Role of Expectations 
The fundamentals of supply and 
demand not only led to higher crude 
oil prices but also fed expectations that 
world demand will continue to grow 
faster than supply. The result is esca-
lated price expectations, which show 
up in futures markets. The anticipated 
price for 2011 crude oil has moved 
steadily upward—from around $60 in 
January 2007 to more than $120 in the 
first week of May 2008 (Chart 4). 
Futures prices reveal oil traders’ 
expectations, but they also feed back 
into current prices. As a market effi-
ciency condition, spot prices have to 
increase with futures prices to keep 
investors equally willing to hold or 
sell the marginal barrel of oil. If cur-
rent and futures prices get out of sync, 
traders taking advantage of arbitrage 
opportunities bring prices back in line.
Forecasters offer another win-
dow on expectations. Their outlooks 
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incorporates projections on the supply 
and demand forces expected to shape 
the marketplace. 
As the realities of higher oil 
prices have sunk in, EIA forecasts 
have marched steadily upward (Chart 
5). The 2004 projection, for example, 
saw prices relatively flat in the $30 
range through 2025. The latest fore-
cast, issued in 2007, anticipates a price 
decline in upcoming years, with oil 
settling above $60 for the long haul 
out to 2030. 
While $60 oil looks good in 
today’s markets, it’s worth noting that 
the EIA’s best guess for long-term 
prices doubled in just four years. It did 
so because the EIA decided its earlier 
demand projections were too low and 
supply projections were too high.
Consider the projected market 
for 2025 (Chart 6). It can be inferred 
that the EIA’s projected demand 
curve moved significantly to the right 
between 2003 and 2007, signaling the 
expectation that consumers will want 
more oil at all prices. It can also be 
inferred that the projected supply curve 
moved significantly to the left, reflecting 
a more pessimistic view about future 
Chart 4
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Chart 5
Forecasters Look for Higher Prices
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can provide additional information 
about possible price scenarios because 
they incorporate data beyond trad-
ers’ sentiments. Each year, the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) 
presents a mainstream forecast, which  The Energy Information 
Administration’s best 
guess for long-term prices 
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production. The market-clearing price 
ends up considerably higher. 
Dollar’s Weakening
Oil has long traded in U.S. dollars. 
Having a single-currency system lowers 
transaction costs for a commodity that 
trades globally. In recent years—while 
oil prices were rising on supply and 
demand fundamentals—the dollar has 
weakened against the currencies of the 
nation’s trading partners, particularly 
the European Union’s. The dollar has 
fallen 46 percent from its mid-2001 
peak against the euro and 21 percent 
since 2004.
A declining dollar makes oil 
cheaper for Europeans and other for-
eign consumers, propping up their 
demand. A weakening U.S. currency 
also reduces the dollar-denominated 
supply from foreign producers. 
Together, these two factors exert 
additional upward pressure on prices. 
Daniel Yergin, chairman of Cambridge 
Energy Research Associates, adds a 
third element in arguing that some 
investors have used oil as a hedge 
against the dollar’s decline. 
How much has the weaken-
If the U.S. currency had 
held its 2001 value against 
the euro, oil would have 
traded at about $80 a 
barrel in early 2008, 
about $21 below its  
actual price.
Chart 6
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Chart 7
Weaker Dollar Drives Oil Prices Higher
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ing dollar added to oil prices? If the 
U.S. currency had held its 2001 value 
against the euro, oil would have traded 
at about $80 a barrel in early 2008, 
about $21 below its actual price (Chart 
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movements accounted for roughly a 
third of the $60 increase in oil prices 
from 2003 to 2007.
Most of the dollar’s price impact 
occurred toward the end of the 
period. When it comes to adjustments 
in oil consumption and production, a 
declining dollar takes time to reshape 
crude oil prices because expectations 
don’t shift quickly. Factors that push 
up expectations of future prices, how-
ever, also put upward pressure on 
spot prices because markets will adjust 
until investors are indifferent between 
holding and selling the marginal barrel 
of crude oil on the spot market. 
Would it matter if oil were priced 
in euros or a basket of consuming 
countries’ currencies? The headlines 
might be somewhat less alarming, 
but little would change in real terms. 
As the dollar’s value declined, U.S. 
consumers would still be paying more 
for oil. It would take more dollars to 
acquire the euros needed to buy oil. 
In a world where the dollar is weak-
ening, the burden of higher oil prices 
would still fall more heavily on the 
U.S. than Europe. 
Geopolitical Risks
The geopolitics of oil is a brew 
for sleepless nights. The Middle East 
sits atop two-thirds of the world’s 
reserves. The region pumps oil amid 
a war in Iraq, potential conflicts else-
where and terrorists prowling for 
targets. Russia, a major non-OPEC 
producer, has expanded state control 
over the oil sector, pulling more of it 
into the realm of dicey internal poli-
tics tinged with nationalism. In recent 
years, violence has cut production by 
a quarter in Nigeria, Africa’s top oil 
producer. Venezuela, South America’s 
largest producer, is under the sway of 
the quixotic Hugo Chavez, who has 
threatened to cut off sales to the U.S.
Tight oil markets don’t have the 
luxury of spare capacity to offset sup-
ply interruptions resulting from trou-
ble in important oil-producing coun-
tries or regions. Because oil demand 
is inelastic, even the temporary or 
How High Are Oil Prices, Really? 
  As oil prices rose to $50, $70 and $90 a barrel, analysts often pointed 
out that these prices hadn’t yet breached the all-time high in real, or inflation-
adjusted, terms. That barrier finally fell in early March, when prices topped the 
real 1980 peak.
  Looking beyond post–World War II or even 20th century oil prices presents 
a somewhat different picture. Real oil prices were nearly as high as they are 
today when North American oil production began before the Civil War in 1860. 
  Oil prices can also be measured relative to changes in productivity and the 
level of technology, factors captured by manufacturing wages.1 In the first quar-
ter of this year, a typical factory worker needed slightly less than four hours to 
“earn” one barrel of oil. In 1980, it was just above five hours. Going further back 
in time, the number rises—to 6.4 hours in 1920, 7.9 in 1910 and an average of 
15.4 in the 1870s. 
  Technological  advances  have  bolstered  productivity,  raised  wages  and 
made the work-time price of oil lower today than it was in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries.
  Finally, it is important to note that—despite rising real prices and imports—
oil siphons relatively less money out of the American economy than it did in the 
past. Expenditures on petroleum products today account for about 5 percent of 
all after-tax income earned in the United States, less than half of the 11.6 percent 
spent in 1980.2
Notes 
1 “Natural Resource Scarcity and Technological Change,” by Stephen P. A. Brown and Daniel Wolk, Federal Reserve  
Bank of Dallas Economic and Financial Review, First Quarter 2000. 
2 Also see “What’s Driving Gasoline Prices?” by Stephen P. A. Brown and Raghav Virmani, Federal Reserve Bank of  
Dallas Economic Letter, October 2007.
Real Oil Prices: A Long View



















SOURCES: Oil and Gas Journal; Department of Energy; Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.  EconomicLetter  FederAl reserve BAnk oF dAllAs   FederAl reserve BAnk oF dAllAs  EconomicLetter 7
partial loss of significant production 
capacity can strongly impact prices. 
Wars, political intervention or unex-
pected breakdowns send shock waves 
through oil markets. Just the fear of a 
supply disruption is itself enough to 
prompt price spikes.
Fears of disruptions are reflected 
more in short-term price movements 
than in longer-term ones. The increas-
es can prove temporary, particularly 
when rumored troubles fail to mate-
rialize. However, the persistent threat 
from some disputes—for example, 
Iran’s long-simmering conflict with the 
U.S.—are likely to keep upward pres-
sure on oil prices for longer periods.
Fear is hard to measure, but the 
futures market offers some help. We 
usually expect futures prices to slope 
upward from the spot price, a pattern 
the financial markets call “contango.” 
However, prices for future delivery 
sometimes dip below the spot prices, 
creating a phenomenon called “back-
wardation.” This can occur because 
of sudden shortages or a jolt of 
uncertainty. 
It’s in this phenomenon that we 
find indirect evidence of fears of oil 
supply disruptions. When fear spreads, 
refiners bid aggressively for short-term 
oil supplies because they face extreme-
ly high costs for shutting down opera-
tions. Not enough oil can be brought 
to market quickly, and spot prices rise 
above futures prices, putting the mar-
ket into backwardation. 
Oil markets have been in the 
grip of backwardation lately, with 
futures prices declining. As spot prices 
climbed toward $120 a barrel in early 
2008, for example, futures prices stood 
at $102 a year out and $100 two years 
out—a clear backwardation (Chart 8). 
Oil Price Prospects
What happens with oil prices will 
be determined by the same four fac-
tors that have shaped the market in 
recent years—global demand, expecta-
tions about future market tightness, the 
value of the dollar and fear of supply 
interruptions. If these factors stay on 
their present course, prices are likely 
to be pushed higher. If one or more 
factors change, markets could see 
some easing of price pressures.
At first blush, crude oil demand 
doesn’t offer much hope for lower 
prices. It is likely to grow with an 
expanding world economy. Higher oil 
prices will prompt some conservation 
and take some of the edge off prices—
but not much.
The past response of U.S. oil con-
sumption to rising prices suggests the 
quadrupling of oil prices since 2003 
might reduce U.S. consumption by 10 
to 20 percent over the next decade. 
Europe might see similar declines. 
However, these reductions won’t be 
sufficient to relieve pressures on  
prices, given the projected demand 
growth from China, the Middle East, 
India and other rapidly expanding 
economies. Only a dramatic, world-
wide move toward energy conserva-
tion or a much stronger U.S. and 
European response to higher oil prices 
could substantially alter the outlook.
Geopolitical factors affecting sup-
ply disruptions aren’t likely to change 
much, either. The Middle East’s heavy 
concentration of conventional oil 
resources suggests the region will 
become an even more important 
source of world oil production. Given 
the region’s historical instability, epi-
sodic fears of supply disruptions could 
Chart 8
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Forecasting exchange rate 
movements is fraught  
with difficulty, but the  
currency is likely to 
strengthen with the U.S. 
economy. A stronger dollar 
would lower oil prices. 
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remain part of oil pricing well into the 
future.
The dollar might offer some relief. 
Forecasting exchange rate movements 
is fraught with difficulty, but the cur-
rency is likely to strengthen with the 
U.S. economy. An appreciating dol-
lar would lower oil prices for U.S. 
consumers. Further dollar weakening, 
however, would lead to higher prices.
Geopolitics and exchange rates 
aside, long-term oil prices will largely 
be set by supply and demand, which 
will affect prices directly and influence 
the expectations that shape futures 
markets. The key lies in how much 
new oil reaches markets. Four scenar-
ios for conventional oil resources show 
a range of outcomes and impacts for 
the trajectory of prices:
• Oil production reaches a pla-
teau or peak—prices likely to rise 
further.
• Oil nationalism continues to 
slow the development of new re-
sources—prices likely to remain rela-
tively high.
• In a shift of strategy, OPEC 
increases its output sharply—prices 
likely to fall.
• Aggressive exploration activities 
pay off with the quick development 
of significant new resources—prices 
likely to fall.
Both the futures markets and EIA 
forecasts currently anticipate some 
softening of oil prices over the next 
few years, suggesting markets expect 
supplies to gain ground on demand. 
International Strategy and Investment, 
an energy consulting business, has 
documented a substantial number of 
projects under way that would boost 
world oil supplies. The development 
of these resources could undermine 
the expectations underlying the higher 
oil price scenarios—even those of oil 
nationalism.
Supplies could be bolstered 
by nonconventional oil sources—
tar sands, oil shale, coal-to-liquids. 
Industry experts regard these resources 
as plentiful, with development and 
production costs well below current 
oil prices. Tar sands and oil shale are 
already in production. Biofuels are too 
limited in scale and currently too cost-
ly to make much difference to crude 
oil pricing.
The substantial development of 
these nonconventional oil resources 
could mean downward pressure on 
crude oil prices in future years. Actual 
and expected costs of nonconventional 
resources suggest it might be difficult 
to sustain oil prices above $70 a bar-
rel. However, the relatively high costs 
of these nonconventional oil sources 
could inhibit development because 
producers fear losses during a price 
collapse. The production and use of 
nonconventional resources would also 
generate more pollution, which could 
mean conventional oil could command 
a premium.
What’s the bottom line? Absent 
supply disruptions, it will be difficult 
to sustain oil prices above $100 (in 
2008 dollars) over the next 10 years.
Brown is director of energy economics 
and microeconomic policy, Virmani is 
a research analyst and Alm is senior 
economics writer in the Research 
Department of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas. 
Notes
1 This article looks at oil prices through the first 
week of May and uses West Texas Intermediate 
as the reference price. Throughout the article, 
we’ve used a combination of daily, weekly, 
monthly, quarterly and annual data, which may 
alter the apparent timing of peaks and troughs 
in prices. 
2 “Running on Empty? How Economic Freedom 
Affects Oil Supplies,” by Stephen P. A. Brown 
and Richard Alm, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Economic Letter, April 2006.
3 In some countries, government policies that 
maintain low prices interfere with the link 
between world oil prices and energy consump-
tion. China, for example, hasn’t fully passed 
price increases on to its consumers.